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This article aims to persuade its reader that libertarianism, at least in several of its varieties, is a species of the genus that Michael Oakeshott referred to as 'rationalism in politics'. I hope to demonstrate, employing the work of Oakeshott as well as Aristotle and Onora O'Neill, how many libertarian theorists, who generally have a sincere and admirable commitment to personal liberty, have been led astray by the rationalist promise that we might be able to approach deductive certainty concerning the 'correctness' of some political programme. The article will argue that a concept such as Pettit's freedom as non-domination is more robust and inclusive of all that we value about freedom than is the libertarian concept of freedom as non-interference. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

This article aims to persuade its reader that libertarianism, at least in several of its varieties, is a species of the genus that Michael Oakeshott referred to as 'rationalism in politics'. I hope to demonstrate, employing the work of Oakeshott as well as Aristotle and Onora O'Neill, how many libertarian theorists, who generally have a sincere and admirable commitment to personal liberty, have been led astray by the rationalist promise that we might be able to approach deductive certainty concerning the 'correctness' of some political programme. The article will argue that a concept such as Pettit's freedom as non-domination is more robust and inclusive of all that we value about freedom than is the libertarian concept of freedom as non-interference.

Nassim Taleb's dismissal of history as based on the 'narrative fallacy'--which reads our present knowledge of past events into our reconstruction of the past--is based on a fundamental misconception of what historians actually do. Historians do not, as Taleb presumes, try to infer general, predictive laws from 'hard' facts, as do natural scientists; instead their aim is to discover the causes of unique historical facts among antecedent facts. This is no different, in principle, from 'narrating' the cause of a supernova by referring to physical causes. The construction of universal historical laws would admittedly be a fool's errand, but that is not the task historians -- as opposed to historicists -- actually set for themselves. Adapted from the source document.

A review essay of, Economic Analysis, Moral Philosophy, & Public Policy (2nd ed., NY: Cambridge U Press, 2006), by Daniel M. Hausman & Michael S. McPherson, calls attention to the authors' argument that current economic practice is more intertwined with moral philosophy than is generally believed. The book provides an overview of the fundamental tenets of modern, mainstream economics & the current state of moral philosophy. The authors emphasize that recognizing the moral judgments contained in economic arguments allows for a more critical examination & better policy choices. However, they understate economic reasoning's case for the superiority of free markets & too quickly dismiss the idea that the "pure" science of economics is capable of arriving at universal truths independent of any ethical stance. Admiration is expressed for the fair way Hausman & McPherson engage libertarian thought even though it is a political program they do not embrace. Their knowledgeable book "presents a serious challenge to the prevailing belief that economists' policy recommendations usually are or can be grounded solely in their scientific opinion.". J. Lindroth

Abstract.  Max Weber and Ludwig von Mises were two of the 20th century's foremost theorists of human action. Mises held Weber, his senior by some 17 years, in great esteem and often discussed his theories, even weaving some, such as Weber's model of ideal types, deeply into the fabric of his own social thought. However, at least at first glance, there seems to be a deep rift between the two men's conceptions about the rationality of action. Weber classified "social actions" into several distinct categories, some of which he saw as exhibiting little, if any, rationality. Mises, in contrast, held that all action is rational by conceptual necessity. Various writers have taken their views to be obviously incompatible, among them, Mises himself. This article suggests that the appearance of a conflict is produced by the failure to discern that Weber and Mises were addressing different sorts of questions and constructing frameworks to support different modes of analyzing social phenomena. I contend that, if that divergence of aim is properly understood, then the apparent contradiction will be seen as illusory.

Despite their numerous differences, British political theorist Michael Oakeshott & Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises held remarkably similar views on the nature of the social sciences. Comparing their presuppositions may help us uncover a common ground for theorizing about human action as well as illuminate their ideas from a new vantage point. References. Adapted from the source document.